To
Shri Narendra Modi
The Hon'ble Prime Minister of India
New Delhi – 110 011
Subject: On the Strikes on Iran — Why India's Expression of Concern Must Now Become a Clear Legal and Moral Position
Respected Prime Minister,
I write as an Advocate — trained to test propositions against the standards of law and evidence, and to weigh arguments by the gravity of their consequences.
Over the years, I have written to successive Prime Ministers on matters of great public interest — on questions of constitutional principle and on failures of governance that the law demands be named. I raise one such matter again today, because a crisis I previously brought to your attention has now collided, in real time, with a war.
India's Ministry of External Affairs has issued a statement expressing concern about the widening conflict in the Middle East and its impact on Indian citizens and the Indian economy. That concern is correct. Every word of it is justified. But concern, expressed without a legal position on the legitimacy of these strikes and without a moral reckoning with what is happening to the people of Iran, is a press release. It is not a foreign policy response adequate to the moment. The world — and the GCC nations watching New Delhi closely — will not remember India's concern. They will remember whether India had a position.
This letter makes the case for that position.
I. WHAT INDIA STANDS TO LOSE
There is a narrow stretch of water, thirty-three kilometres wide at its narrowest point, that sits between Oman and Iran. Through it flows approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day — roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption. Through it also flows approximately one-fifth of all globally traded liquefied natural gas. It is called the Strait of Hormuz. Since February 28, 2026, it has been a theatre of active war.
India imports nearly five million barrels of crude oil a day, making it the world's third-largest oil consumer, with import dependence exceeding 88%. In Financial Year 2024–25, India spent approximately $137 billion — roughly ₹11.44 lakh crore — solely on crude oil imports. Between 35% and 50% of those imports transit the Strait of Hormuz, drawn primarily from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. To feel the true weight of this number: the combined annual revenues of Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka — three states governing nearly 38 crore Indians — amount to approximately ₹12.87 lakh crore. India's annual crude oil import bill nearly matches that entire combined figure. Every rupee of it leaves India permanently, paid to nations now engulfed in conflict.
The damage is not a future projection. It is a present reality. Oil prices have already surged more than 10% since the strikes began. The rupee has slumped to a record low. These are not possibilities being modelled by analysts. They are consequences already recorded in the data, already being felt by every Indian who buys fuel, pays an electricity bill, or holds a rupee.
And crude oil is only the beginning of the exposure.
India is the world's fourth-largest importer of liquefied natural gas, and relies on LNG to meet approximately half of its natural gas requirements. Qatar alone supplies approximately 42% of India's LNG. Roughly half of India's total LNG imports — drawn from Qatar and the UAE — transit the Strait of Hormuz. LNG is not a peripheral fuel. It powers city gas distribution networks, industrial manufacturing, and electricity generation. Unlike crude oil, it cannot be stockpiled with comparable ease. The infrastructure demands and technical complexity of LNG storage place a hard structural limit on how much buffer any importing nation can maintain.
India's crude oil stocks at the refinery level cover approximately 25 days of consumption. Strategic petroleum reserves add roughly another week. That is six to eight weeks of cover for crude — not negligible, but not permanent. For LNG, the buffer is structurally thinner. Qatar's LNG production facilities have been struck and output disrupted. Tanker traffic through the Strait has effectively halted, as insurers and shipping companies have withdrawn from the route.
As per ICRA's calculations, a $10 per barrel increase in the average crude price, sustained over a fiscal year, adds $12–13 billion to India's import bill and enlarges the current account deficit by 0.3% of GDP. That single sustained $10 elevation — not a dramatic spike, but a $10 rise held across a year — would cost India an additional amount equivalent to the full annual revenue receipts of Kerala, a state of 3.5 crore people celebrated for its human development, literacy, and healthcare. The rise already underway is larger than $10. The rupee is already at a record low. The arithmetic of this war is not hypothetical. It is already being written into India's accounts.
The consequences do not stop at India's energy markets. Qatar and the UAE together account for 53% of India's LNG imports. They account for 99% of Pakistan's LNG imports and 72% of Bangladesh's. Pakistan's economy was already under severe structural stress before this war began. Bangladesh is already running a gas deficit of more than 1,300 million cubic feet per day. A sustained energy price shock of the kind this conflict guarantees will not merely strain these economies further. It will accelerate crises that have, historically, translated directly into the export of instability across India's borders. Every dollar added to the sustained global price of energy makes our troubled neighbours more fragile. Every increment of that fragility has, by the established logic of recent history, arrived eventually at India's border posts.
Shia communities have already held protests across eleven states of India within days of the strikes beginning. Whatever their character, their occurrence is a measure of how quickly a war in the Persian Gulf travels inward.
This is the cost of India's current position — not as a projection, but as a present arithmetic.
II. THE FIFTY-YEAR WOUND WE INFLICTED ON OURSELVES
There is a bitter irony at the heart of India's vulnerability to this war. Our exposure to the Strait of Hormuz, to Qatari LNG, to Gulf crude — this dependency is not simply the result of geography or global markets. It is the direct result of a fifty-year act of governance failure. One I previously brought to your attention in a detailed written submission. One the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has since confirmed in institutional terms.
In 1974, Parliament enacted the Oil Industry (Development) Act with a clear and visionary purpose: to levy a dedicated cess on domestic crude oil production and to channel every rupee of it to the Oil Industry Development Board — to fund exploration, enhanced recovery, and energy self-sufficiency. As the Supreme Court has consistently held, a cess is constitutionally distinct from a general tax. A tax flows into the Consolidated Fund for general purposes. A cess is an earmarked levy — money collected for a stated purpose, legally obligated to be spent on that purpose and no other. To collect a cess and divert its proceeds to general revenues is, in the language the law uses for such things, a fraud upon Parliament's own mandate.
This is precisely what happened. According to the CAG, between FY 1974–75 and FY 2023–24, the Central Government collected ₹2,94,850.56 crore — nearly ₹2.95 lakh crore — from domestic oil producers under the OID cess. Of this legally mandated corpus, only ₹902.40 crore has ever been transferred to the OIDB. Not a single rupee has been transferred since FY 1991–92 (Audit Report No. 16 of 2025).
99.7% of fifty years of cess — money that was constitutionally the property of India's energy security — was silently absorbed into general revenues to bridge fiscal deficits that successive governments chose not to address by other means.
This was the capital required for deep-water exploration in the Krishna-Godavari basin, for Enhanced Oil Recovery in the aging fields of Assam and Gujarat, and for unlocking India's untapped shale and tight gas reserves. Had it been deployed as Parliament intended, India today would be producing more of its own oil and gas, importing less, and carrying a fraction of the vulnerability it now bears. Instead, that capital was spent elsewhere, the fields were left underdeveloped, and India's import dependence grew year after year until it crossed 88%.
The governments that diverted that cess are not here to bear the consequences. India's citizens are — in a falling rupee, in rising fuel costs, and in the anxiety of a nation that imports nearly everything it burns.
III. THIS WAR IS UNLAWFUL — AND THE LAW IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
Having established what this war is costing India, let us now examine what it is in law.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter — the cornerstone of the post-1945 international order — provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." The permissible exceptions are precisely two: a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII, or self-defence under Article 51 when an armed attack has occurred and the response is necessary and proportionate. No Security Council resolution authorised these strikes. Not one.
Customary international law permits anticipatory self-defence only when a threat is imminent and unavoidable — not possible, not foreseeable, but imminent, in the sense that no moment remains for any other response. The standard is strict precisely because the alternative — a world in which states may strike each other on the basis of speculative future threats — would render Article 2(4) meaningless.
The facts here are not in dispute. Iran and the United States had been in indirect nuclear negotiations mediated by Oman since February 6. On February 27 — one day before the strikes began — Oman's Foreign Minister reported a breakthrough: Iran had agreed to forgo the stockpiling of enriched uranium and to full IAEA verification. Technical delegations were scheduled to travel to Vienna the following Monday. Tehran was, in the precise week it was bombed, in active diplomatic engagement aimed at preventing the war that then fell upon it. The claim of an imminent armed attack is not merely unproven. It is contradicted by the diplomatic record that both parties had themselves created.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has stated, unambiguously, that these strikes violated Iran's sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and the UN Charter. This is not political opinion. It is an authoritative institutional assessment of the foundational law of the international order. India was among the original signatories of that Charter in 1945. An expression of concern about the humanitarian and economic impact of this war, without any acknowledgment of this named legal violation, is not a position commensurate with India's standing in international law or its history as a founding voice in the construction of that order.
IV. THE STRATEGIC QUESTION WE MUST HONESTLY ASK
Beyond its illegality, this war raises a question of strategic judgment that India is entitled to ask.
The stated objectives of the operation have ranged, across different communications and different media engagements, from the destruction of Iran's nuclear programme, to the elimination of its ballistic missile capability, to the sinking of its navy, to the removal of its regime — sometimes offered simultaneously, sometimes in succession, with different formulations provided to different audiences within the same day. Senior members of the United States Senate Intelligence Committee have publicly noted that the goals of this operation appeared to have changed four or five times within its first days. A war must have a coherent purpose if it is to have any coherent end. A war whose rationale shifts with each media cycle is a war that has substituted momentum for strategy.
This matters because of what lies on the other side of the calculation. Iran is a nation of 93 million people, with a recorded civilisational history spanning 2,500 years and a demonstrated capacity for asymmetric retaliation. It has absorbed punishment before. It has emerged from it more consolidated, not less.
The concern — and it is a genuine strategic concern, not a personal one — is whether Mr. Trump is bringing to this war the same pattern of decision-making that marked his business ventures: grand promises at the outset, shifting rationales in the execution, and the costs of miscalculation borne by those least able to pay them. His casino businesses — the most naturally profitable enterprises in the American economy — went through more bankruptcies than any comparable business in the country. The consistent pattern across those failures was not bad luck. It was optimism substituted for analysis, and the burden of failure transferred to others. The question India is entitled to ask is whether those same instincts are now being applied to a theatre where the bill, when it comes, will be paid not only by the people of Iran, but by the energy-importing economies of Asia.
The historical record on the underlying strategy offers nothing by way of comfort. For over a century, states including the United States, European states, Russia, and Israel have attempted to topple governments through air power alone. It has never worked. Not in the era of unguided bombs. Not in the era of precision munitions. The United States did not achieve it through the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, the Balkans, or Iraq. Russia did not achieve it in Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Ukraine. The reason is not technical. It is political. Air power can destroy objects and kill people, but it cannot change the direction of a society's politics — particularly when the act of bombing is itself the most powerful political event that society is experiencing. It radicalises. It consolidates. It hands the regime being bombed a narrative of national survival that no domestic opposition can compete with.
There is a further asymmetry that history consistently confirms. American political culture, shaped by democratic accountability and the scrutiny of a free press, tends to react sharply to sustained casualties and prolonged uncertainty. Iranian political culture, shaped by the experience of a brutal eight-year war with Iraq and by a framework that valorises sacrifice in the face of foreign aggression, has historically demonstrated a far higher tolerance for hardship under external attack. Under such conditions, sustained aerial punishment is more likely to harden the Iranian state than to dissolve it.
India's energy security, its citizens in the Gulf, and the stability of its neighbourhood cannot afford to be collateral in someone else's open-ended miscalculation.
V. WHAT THE GCC MEANS TO INDIA — AND WHAT IS NOW AT RISK
India genuinely wants a prosperous GCC. This is not diplomatic courtesy. It is a statement of strategic self-interest rooted in the most consequential economic relationship India has built in its extended neighbourhood over the past two decades.
The GCC nations have been executing one of the most ambitious economic transformations in modern history — moving deliberately, and at scale, from oil-dependent economies into diversified global hubs of finance, logistics, technology, and tourism. The airports of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha became the transit hubs of Asia. The ports of Jebel Ali and Khalifa became critical nodes in global trade logistics. New financial centres, technology corridors, and tourism economies were built with a clear and disciplined vision of what the post-oil Gulf must become. India was, and must remain, the natural partner in that transformation.
The numbers are a measure of what has been built together. In FY 2024–25, India-GCC bilateral trade reached $178.56 billion, accounting for 15.42% of India's global trade — making the GCC India's single largest trading partner grouping. The GCC has invested cumulatively over $28.28 billion in India by December 2024. The investment relationship is deepening in the other direction as well: Indian companies have grown their investments in the GCC by nearly 400% since 2019, making India the second-largest source country for FDI projects into the Gulf. A formal Free Trade Agreement between India and the GCC, whose negotiations were launched just days before this war began, now hangs in the balance.
At the centre of this relationship are the people who built it.
According to the Indian government's own most recent estimate, approximately 9.3 million Indians live and work in the Persian Gulf. To grasp what that number means: more Indians live in the Persian Gulf than there are citizens of Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain combined. They are not a statistical category. They are the engineers, the nurses, the construction workers, the entrepreneurs, and the domestic workers who have built their lives and their families' futures on the stability of this region. Together, they contribute to an annual remittance flow of $125 billion — the largest such flow from any country's diaspora in the world. Despite constituting roughly one-quarter of India's total overseas population, Gulf-based Indians account for almost 40% of India's total remittance inflows. These are not entries in a balance of payments table. They are the school fees paid in Kerala, the homes built in Andhra Pradesh, the elderly parents kept in dignity in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, and the college admissions funded by years of labour in conditions that most of us will never experience.
The prosperity of the Gulf rests on a foundation that has a name: peace. It is that peace — that promise of stability, of openness, of safe and reliable commerce — that is now being destroyed. Dubai's Palm Jumeirah has been struck. The Burj Al Arab has suffered fire damage. Jebel Ali port has been hit. Dubai International Airport — the world's busiest by international passenger traffic — has been damaged and temporarily closed. The airlines that made the Gulf's airports the transit hubs of Asia have suspended operations. Each of these is not merely a landmark. Each is a pillar of the promise the GCC made to the world: that this is a place where business is safe, where investment is protected, and where the rules of commerce hold.
When missiles fall on the Burj Al Arab and smoke rises over Jebel Ali, that promise is being repriced in real time. Every day of disruption is a day that the GCC's hard-built reputation for stability — the very foundation on which 9.3 million Indians built their livelihoods — is eroded a little further. India bears the cost of every increment of that erosion.
The GCC nations count on India. They look to New Delhi as a trusted partner, a balanced voice, and a stable anchor in a world that is becoming rapidly less stable. They have received, so far, an expression of concern about the impact on Indian citizens and the Indian economy. That concern is genuine. But the nations of the Gulf, in their moment of crisis, deserve more than a neighbour who articulates its own vulnerability. They deserve a partner who speaks to the principle at stake.
VI. THE MORAL DIMENSION
On the first day of the operation, a girls' elementary school in Minab, in southern Iran, was struck while its students were at their desks. Iranian authorities have confirmed 165 dead — most of them girls aged between seven and twelve. The strikes fell on the first day of Iran's working week, at the hour when children are at school and adults at work. UNESCO has condemned the strike as a grave violation of humanitarian law. The United Nations Secretary-General has condemned it. The world has condemned it.
India's statement has not addressed it.
The Iranian regime's killing of thousands of its own citizens during the protests of January 2026 is a crime that deserves unequivocal condemnation — and it receives it here, without reservation. But that crime does not license a new one. One atrocity does not justify another. The people of Iran were being killed by their own government. Now they are being bombed by foreign powers that promised them liberation. They were bombed while their government was, in that very week, in diplomatic negotiations aimed at preventing exactly this war.
A statement that expresses concern about the impact on Indian citizens and the Indian economy — without naming what happened in Minab, without acknowledging what the Secretary-General has said about the law, without calling for the war to stop — is a statement that history will record as insufficient to the moment.
URGENT PRAYERS
In light of the foregoing, I respectfully and urgently pray:
1. From Concern to Position.
India's foreign ministry has correctly expressed concern about the impact of this conflict on its citizens and its economy. I urge that India now move, urgently and publicly, from concern to a clear legal and moral position. India must condemn the strikes as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, call for an immediate ceasefire, demand the return of all parties to the negotiating table, and offer India's good offices as a trusted, neutral mediator. We must move urgently in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly to demand an emergency session on the protection of civilians. The GCC nations, whose prosperity India genuinely wants and whose stability is inseparable from India's own security and economic wellbeing, deserve a partner who says what the moment requires — not merely one who notes what it fears.
2. Honour Parliament's Own Mandate — in the Forthcoming Parliamentary Session.
The Ministry of Finance must legally commit to transferring 100% of whatever OID cess is henceforth collected exclusively to the Oil Industry Development Board, for the purposes Parliament intended in 1974. The 99.7% diversion over fifty years, confirmed by the CAG, must be formally ended by legislative amendment. The fiscal regime governing domestic oil and gas production must be restructured to incentivise exploration — so that the import dependency this war has exposed as an active threat to national security is, over time, dismantled.
Hon'ble Prime Minister, what has happened this week is not, at its root, a distant foreign crisis.
It is the convergence of two failures — one imposed from outside, one self-inflicted over fifty years — into a single, compounding moment of vulnerability. The war in the Persian Gulf has arrived not merely on the front pages, but in the rupee's record low, in India's LNG supply chains, in the cities where 9.3 million of its citizens live and work, and on the borders of its most fragile neighbours. The fifty-year betrayal of Parliament's own law has ensured that India meets this moment without the domestic energy production that should, by now, have been built. We are maximally exposed at precisely the moment when maximum exposure carries maximum cost.
India has expressed concern. Concern is a beginning. But a nation of India's size, history, and strategic weight — an original signatory of the UN Charter, a democracy of 1.4 billion people, the trusted partner of the very nations now in the line of fire — is called upon to do more than express concern. It is called upon to name what is unlawful, to demand what is necessary, and to offer what it uniquely can: a principled, independent voice in a world that is rapidly running out of them.
The schoolgirls of Minab did not die so that the world could issue a concerned statement. India must not be the nation that stops there.
This letter is addressed to the Prime Minister in his public capacity and is simultaneously being placed in the public domain, in the tradition of an independent bar that has always understood its duty to extend beyond the courtroom.