To
Shri Narendra Modi
The Hon'ble Prime Minister of India
South Block, New Delhi – 110 011
And to every Member of the Parliament of India
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha

Subject: On the War Against Iran, India's Energy Dependence, and a Fifty-Year Failure to Implement Parliament's Own Law

Respected Prime Minister, and Respected Members of Parliament,

A Note on Why This Letter Is Addressed to Parliament

A letter from a member of the Bar addressed jointly to the Prime Minister and to every Member of Parliament is an unusual step.

This letter raises two issues. The first is a foreign policy matter: the ongoing war against Iran and what it requires of India. The second is a statutory matter: a law enacted by Parliament in 1974 that has not been properly implemented for over fifty years.

On the foreign policy question, the Prime Minister is the appropriate address because foreign policy is an executive function. But on the statutory question, the body that must be informed is Parliament itself — not a single ministry. Parliament made the law. Parliament alone has the authority to insist that its own mandate be honoured.

That is why every Member of Parliament has been copied.

I should also mention that this is not my first letter on either of these subjects. I have written to successive Prime Ministers on matters of constitutional significance and public interest. I raised the issue of the Oil Industry Development Act and the diversion of the cess collected under it in an earlier communication to the Prime Minister. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India has since confirmed those concerns in its Audit Report No. 16 of 2025. The crisis that letter anticipated has now arrived. A war has broken out in the Persian Gulf, and India is exposed to it in ways that were entirely foreseeable and that decades of governance failure have made far worse.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOMETHING IS UNDERSTOOD WHEN IT IS ABSENT

There is a simple truth that experience teaches in every domain of life.

We rarely think about electricity when it flows without interruption. We think about it the moment it stops.

We rarely think about water when it arrives from the tap. We think about it when the supply is cut.

Energy works the same way. India has had relatively uninterrupted access to imported crude oil and natural gas for decades. There have been price spikes, there have been pressures on the currency — but the fuel has kept arriving. Tankers have kept moving. Pipelines have kept flowing. Because the supply has continued, the fragility of the system that delivers it has never become a matter of serious public attention.

The supply is now under genuine threat. On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States began joint air attacks on Iran, starting a war aimed at destroying Iran's missile programme and bringing about regime change. The joint military operation resulted in the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran responded with missile and drone strikes against Israel and US bases and US allies in the region. As this letter is written, the war is in its ninth day. It is not contained. It is spreading. And it has already arrived in India's maritime neighbourhood.

II. THE WAR IS ILLEGAL — AND THE LAW ON THIS IS NOT AMBIGUOUS

Before examining what this war costs India, it is necessary to state plainly what it is in law.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is the foundational rule of the international legal order. It prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. The permissible exceptions are precisely two: a Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII of the Charter, or self-defence under Article 51 where an armed attack has actually occurred and the response is both necessary and proportionate to that attack.

No Security Council resolution authorised these strikes.

The United States has claimed self-defence; that Iran was preparing an imminent attack. The diplomatic record both the parties themselves created in the days immediately before the bombs fell contradict United States’ claims.

On 6 February 2026, Iran and the United States held indirect nuclear negotiations in Oman's capital, Muscat. Iran emphasised that progress depended on consultations in capitals. A second round of nuclear talks was scheduled in Geneva. Just before the strikes began, on 27 February 2026, Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi said a "breakthrough" had been reached and Iran had agreed both to never stockpile enriched uranium and to full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. A nation that was one day away from a diplomatic breakthrough is not a nation preparing an imminent armed attack. That is not a political argument. It is a factual observation.

The European Council on Foreign Relations has stated that "Trump's strikes on Iran are an illegal war of choice." The Secretary-General of the United Nations has condemned the strikes as violations of Iran's sovereignty and the UN Charter.

India was among the original signatories of that Charter in 1945. A statement expressing concern about the economic impact of an illegal war — without naming the illegality — is not a legal position. It is not commensurate with India's standing as a founding voice in the construction of that international order.

India must say what the law says. The law is clear.

III. WHY INDIA CANNOT SIMPLY STOP IMPORTING OIL

Members of Parliament will be familiar with the argument that is sometimes made in public discourse: if oil imports are damaging the economy, simply reduce or stop them.

India cannot stop importing crude oil. Not tomorrow. Not this year. Not within several years.

According to data from the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, India's import dependence for crude oil in the financial year 2024–25 touched 88.2%.In FY 2024–25, India imported around 242.4 million tonnes of crude oil, while domestic production dropped to 28.7 million tonnes — meaning the country met only 11.8% of its petroleum needs from local sources. What does this mean in ordinary terms?

Every truck that carries tomatoes from a farm in Maharashtra to a market in Delhi runs on diesel. Every train that carries onions from Nashik to Chennai runs on diesel. Every tractor that ploughs a field in Punjab runs on diesel. Every fishing boat off the coast of Kerala runs on diesel. Every ambulance, every school bus, every goods vehicle on every national highway in this country runs on diesel. Diesel is refined from crude oil.

India's agricultural produce is grown in specific regions. It reaches the rest of the country only by road and rail. Those roads and rails run on fuel derived mostly from imported crude oil. If that fuel were to disappear or substantially reduce, the consequences would be felt in the vegetable market. Agricultural produce that cannot be transported cannot be sold. It rots in the field or at the mandi. Farmers who cannot sell their produce cannot cover their costs. Food that does not move does not reach the millions of Indian families who depend on it arriving from distant places.

Within days of a complete or near-complete fuel stoppage, food prices would begin to rise sharply in cities. Within weeks, shortages would appear.

This is not a dramatic prediction. It is a description of how supply chains work. The point of making it here is simple: crude oil imports are not a policy option. They are a structural necessity. India depends on them as completely as it depends on the monsoon. The question is not whether to import energy. The question is at what price, from where, and with what degree of vulnerability to disruption.

That is precisely why what happens in the Persian Gulf matters so directly to every Indian citizen.

IV. THE SCALE OF THE EXPOSURE

In FY 2024–25, India spent around $137 billion on crude oil imports — a 3% increase from the previous year. That is approximately ₹11.44 lakh crore in a single year, paid to nations whose oil and gas now flows through a war zone.

It is worth pausing on that number. The combined annual revenues of the governments of Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal — three states that together govern a substantial share of India's population — do not reach this figure. It is money that leaves India permanently, every year, in exchange for the fuel that keeps the country moving.

Around 35% to 50% of India's crude oil imports may be linked to shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz. India sources about 42% of its LNG from Qatar, whose exports transit the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway — approximately 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest point — that sits between Oman and Iran. Through it flows nearly one-fifth of the world's traded petroleum and LNG. Since 28 February 2026, it has been a theatre of active war.

In the same period, India's dependence on imported natural gas also jumped to 50.8% — the highest in four years. India's fertiliser industry accounts for 33% of all natural gas consumed in the country. This connection matters greatly. Fertiliser is not a luxury input. It is what makes wheat grow, what sustains rice yields, what enables India to feed itself. A disruption in the supply of natural gas does not stay in the energy sector. It travels directly into agriculture. It travels into food prices. It travels into the cost of every meal eaten by every Indian family.

Now consider what happens to prices when a war breaks out in the region through which this fuel flows.

V. ON OIL PRICES — AND WHY EVEN SPECULATIVE RISES ARE REAL

Oil prices are not set in the fields of Iraq or the refineries of Saudi Arabia. They are set on trading floors — primarily in London and New York — where contracts for future delivery of crude oil are bought and sold by traders, hedge funds, banks, and financial institutions.

This means that the price India pays for oil can sometimes move for reasons that have little to do with the actual physical availability of crude at any given moment. A speech, a rumour, a satellite image of military assets near a strait — any of these can cause prices to spike on trading floors within minutes, well before any actual disruption in supply has occurred. The gap between the price signal and the physical reality can, on some days, be wide.

But here is the crucial point: India buys its oil at prices benchmarked to those trading floors. The contract terms that Indian refineries negotiate with Gulf producers are linked to international benchmarks — Brent crude, the Dubai-Oman basket, and similar indices. When the benchmark moves on the London or New York exchange — even if the movement is driven by speculation rather than actual scarcity — the price India pays moves with it.

The speculative price and the real price are, for India's purposes, the same price.

This is not a theoretical concern. Prices have already risen sharply since the strikes of 28 February. Higher imports mean higher demand for dollars, which weakens the Indian rupee. Any global spike in oil prices directly hits transport, manufacturing, and food costs in India. Both of these effects are already visible in India's economic data today.

What is more alarming is the assessment of those who watch energy markets professionally. Several analysts and economists are now cautioning that the market's response has, if anything, been more restrained than the situation warrants. They warn that if this war continues for several more weeks — if the Strait of Hormuz remains a contested zone, if insurance companies continue to withdraw coverage for tankers on that route, if LNG shipments from Qatar remain disrupted — oil prices could reach levels not seen in decades. The initial market response, in their view, was not an overreaction. It may have been an underreaction.

This is the other edge of the uncertainty. If Mr. Trump and the Israeli government decide tomorrow to call off the strikes — as suddenly as they were started — oil prices could return to pre-war levels within days. Markets move quickly in both directions. By the time this letter reaches every Member of Parliament, it is possible that the immediate price crisis will have eased.

But this letter might not be irrelevant even if that happens. Because even if oil prices return to where they were on 27 February, the world has changed. Iran will never be the same country it was before this war began. The Middle East will never be the same region. The Strait of Hormuz has been demonstrated to be a theatre of active war, not merely a theoretical chokepoint. The question of what India does when that strait is next threatened — and there will be a next time — remains entirely unanswered. The unfinished business of India's energy vulnerability does not disappear when a ceasefire is declared. It remains, waiting for the next crisis to expose it again.

VI. THE FIFTY-YEAR FAILURE — PARLIAMENT'S OWN LAW

Members of Parliament, here is the domestic failure that this war has now exposed with full clarity.

Crude oil production has declined from 36.96 million metric tonnes in 2015–16 to 28.70 million metric tonnes in 2024–25, attributed to depletion of reserves and limited contribution from new discoveries. Crude oil imports have jumped by 41% and LNG imports by 100% during the same period. This decline is not an act of geology alone. It is, in significant part, an act of governance — a sustained, fifty-year diversion of funds that Parliament itself had earmarked for energy security.

In 1974, Parliament enacted the Oil Industry (Development) Act with a clear and deliberate purpose. The Act levied a cess on domestic crude oil production. The proceeds of that cess were to be transferred to the Oil Industry Development Board — the OIDB — to fund exploration, enhanced recovery, and the development of India's domestic oil and gas capacity. Parliament's intent was explicit and unambiguous. The money was not for general use. It was earmarked for one purpose.

A cess is constitutionally distinct from a general tax. A tax flows into the Consolidated Fund and may be applied to any purpose the government chooses. A cess is an earmarked levy — collected for a specific stated purpose, legally obligated to be spent on that purpose and no other. This distinction is not a technicality. It is the constitutional basis on which Parliament consented to the collection. To collect a cess and divert it to general revenues is to act against Parliament's explicit mandate.

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India has now confirmed, in Audit Report No. 16 of 2025, what this writer previously brought to the Prime Minister's attention. Between FY 1974–75 and FY 2023–24, the Central Government collected approximately ₹2,94,850 crore under the Oil Industry Development cess. Of this entire sum, only ₹902 crore was ever transferred to the Oil Industry Development Board. Not a single rupee has been transferred since FY 1991–92.

Let those numbers settle for a moment.

Nearly three lakh crore rupees was collected. Nine hundred crore rupees was transferred. 99.7% of fifty years of cess — money that was constitutionally the property of India's energy security — was absorbed into general revenues.

This was the capital that Parliament intended for deep-water exploration in the Krishna-Godavari basin. For Enhanced Oil Recovery in the ageing fields of Assam and Gujarat. For unlocking India's untapped shale and tight gas reserves. Had it been deployed as Parliament directed, India would today be producing significantly more of its own oil and gas. Its import dependence would be lower. Its vulnerability to a war in the Persian Gulf would be a fraction of what it now is.

Instead, that capital was spent on other things. The fields were left underdeveloped. Behind the facade of historic transformations and profits lies a dark secret: domestic production of crude oil and gas is on a long-term decline. Ministry data shows that crude oil production fell by 26.3% and natural gas by 24.1% during FY12–FY25.The governments that made this diversion over fifty years are not here to bear the consequences of their choices. India's citizens are — in a falling rupee, in rising fuel costs, and in the anxiety of a nation that imports nearly everything it burns, at a moment when the region it imports from is at war.

This is not merely a financial audit observation. It is a constitutional failure. Parliament enacted a law. Parliament's law was not implemented. The institution that is best placed to demand accountability for that failure is Parliament itself. That is why this letter is addressed to every Member of Parliament.

VII. THE SINKING OF THE IRIS DENA — AN AFFRONT IN INDIA'S OWN WATERS

On 4 March 2026, something happened in India's maritime neighbourhood that deserves to be named plainly and without euphemism.

On 16 February 2026, the Iranian naval frigate IRIS Dena sailed to India to participate in the International Fleet Review 2026 and the multinational naval exercise MILAN held at Visakhapatnam. Prior to the exercise, the crew members had also embarked on a cultural visit of India, visiting the Taj Mahal and Kailashgiri, as well as participating in a city parade. Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Shahram Irani attended and held talks with India's Chief of Naval Staff. Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh presided over the opening ceremony under the event's theme, "United Through Oceans." India's Navy and Defence Ministry confirmed that the Iranian warship had participated in the International Fleet Review and the multilateral naval exercise MILAN 2026, organised by the Indian Navy in the port of Visakhapatnam from 15 to 25 February. The Ministry said 74 countries had joined the events. The IRIS Dena was India's guest. She had been welcomed in India's port. Her officers had met India's naval chiefs. Her crew had walked India's streets and stood at India's monuments. Then she sailed home.

She was returning home when she was sunk in international waters, approximately 19 nautical miles off the coast of Galle, Sri Lanka. A United States submarine sank the Iranian warship with a torpedo in international waters off Sri Lanka's coast. At least 87 individuals were killed in the attack, while at least 61 others remained missing. This was the first instance of a nuclear-powered submarine sinking an enemy surface vessel since the Falklands War. It is the first such naval action by a US Navy submarine since the Pacific theatre of World War II. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called it "an atrocity at sea, 2,000 miles from Iran's shores," noting that the ship had been a guest of India's navy when struck without warning. In a post on social media, Araghchi called IRIS Dena "India's guest" and condemned the United States for perpetrating the act in the Indian Ocean. The Prime Minister of India has described the Indian Navy as the guardian of the Indian Ocean. India sees itself as a security provider in the Indian Ocean. On Wednesday, it could not save even its own guest. Neither New Delhi nor the Indian Navy has criticised — even mildly — the decision by the United States to sink the Iranian warship. India’s silence is not strategic ambiguity. There is a difference between keeping one's counsel and being seen to have none. A nation that invites the navies of 74 countries to exercise in its waters, under the theme "United Through Oceans," and then watches one of those guests be torpedoed in its maritime neighbourhood without a word of public comment — that nation has not exercised strategic restraint. It has suffered a visible erosion of its credibility as a maritime power and as a host nation. Now, with the war expanding into the Indian Ocean and Iranian vessels allegedly still in the area, neighbouring nations are watching nervously. India has said nothing.

VIII. WHAT INDIA HAS BUILT WITH THE GULF — AND WHAT IS NOW AT RISK

The relationship between India and the Gulf Cooperation Council is not diplomatic courtesy. It is the most consequential economic partnership India has built in its extended neighbourhood.

In FY 2024–25, India-GCC bilateral trade reached USD 178.56 billion, accounting for 15.42% of India's global trade. The GCC is India's single largest trading partner grouping. Cumulative GCC investments in India crossed $28.28 billion by December 2024.

At the heart of this relationship are people.

Despite making up only about one-quarter of India's overseas population, Indian nationals in Gulf states send almost 40% of the country's bank remittances. In 2024, India solidified its position as the world's leading remittance recipient, with overseas workers sending a record $129.4 billion. These are not entries in a balance of payments table. They are the school fees paid in Kerala. The homes built in Andhra Pradesh. The elderly parents kept in dignity in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. The college admissions funded by years of labour in conditions that most of us will never experience. They are the financial foundation of millions of Indian families — not the families of the prosperous, but of the working people of this country who went abroad to build something for those left behind.

The prosperity of the Gulf rests on a foundation that has a name: peace. It is that peace — that promise of stability, of openness, of safe and reliable commerce — that is now being damaged, day by day.

Iranian missiles have targeted the headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain's Juffair area multiple times. Bahrain's Ministry of Interior also confirmed that the country's international airport was targeted with a drone, resulting in material damage.Amazon's Bahrain data centre was targeted. One of its facilities was damaged by a nearby drone strike. Two data centres in the United Arab Emirates were also damaged after they were directly struck by drones. All of the facilities remained offline.Each of these strikes is a blow to the economic architecture that nearly one crore Indians helped build. The promise of the Gulf — that it is a safe place to work, to invest, to do business — is being repriced in real time. Every day of this war is a day that promise is eroded a little further.

The GCC nations count on India. They look to New Delhi as a trusted partner, a balanced voice, and a stable anchor in a region that is becoming rapidly less stable. They have received, so far, an expression of concern about the impact on Indian citizens and the Indian economy. That concern is genuine. But the nations of the Gulf, in their moment of crisis, deserve more than a neighbour who articulates its own vulnerability. They deserve a partner who speaks to the principle at stake.

IX. THE STRATEGIC QUESTION THIS WAR RAISES

One strategic observation must be made, however, because it bears directly on how long India's exposure to this crisis will last.

Media outlets have noted the Trump administration's shifting explanations for why the United States began this war. The stated objectives have ranged from the destruction of Iran's nuclear programme, to the elimination of its ballistic missile capability, to the removal of its government — sometimes offered simultaneously, in different formulations, to different audiences, within the same news cycle. A war must have a coherent purpose if it is to have a coherent end. A war whose rationale shifts with each briefing is a war that has substituted momentum for strategy.

The historical record on regime change through air power is consistent and unambiguous. For over a century, states have attempted to topple governments from the air. It has not worked — not in the era of unguided bombs, not in the era of precision munitions. Air power can destroy objects and kill people, but it cannot change the direction of a society's politics. It cannot dissolve a state's institutional structure. It cannot determine who fills the vacuum that destruction leaves behind. What it reliably does — and this is confirmed by the experience of every major air campaign from the Second World War onward — is harden the population of the bombed country against those doing the bombing. It provides the government under attack with a narrative of national survival and foreign aggression that no domestic opposition can compete with.

Iran is a nation of 93 million people with a recorded civilisational history spanning millennia. It has absorbed punishment before and emerged from it more consolidated, not less. The eight-year war with Iraq — one of the most brutal conflicts of the twentieth century — did not dissolve the Iranian state. It deepened it.

The concern — and it is a genuine strategic concern, not a personal one — is whether this war will achieve any of its stated objectives, or whether it will instead produce a more unstable Iran, a more unstable Middle East, and a more permanently disrupted energy supply to Asia's import-dependent economies. India's energy security and the stability of its neighbourhood cannot afford to be collateral damage in an open-ended miscalculation.

Even if a ceasefire comes tomorrow, the strategic landscape has changed permanently. Iran will be a different country on the other side of this war — more wounded, more suspicious of the international order, more willing to use asymmetric means to impose costs on those who attacked it. The Middle East will be a more fractured region. The norms of international law will have been more visibly degraded. The Strait of Hormuz will have demonstrated that it is a real chokepoint, not a theoretical one. And India — unless it finds its voice — will have demonstrated that it can be ignored in its own maritime neighbourhood.

X. THE MORAL DIMENSION

This letter cannot close without addressing what happened at a school in Minab, in southern Iran, on the first day of this war.

The deadliest single incident occurred in the city of Minab in southeastern Iran, where a strike fell on an elementary girls' school. Iran's Health Ministry states the strike killed approximately 180 young children. These were children at their desks on a school morning. They were not soldiers. They were not near a military facility. They were seven-year-olds and ten-year-olds sitting in a classroom when the ceiling fell on them.

UNESCO has condemned the strike. The United Nations Secretary-General has condemned it. Nations across the world have condemned it.

India's public statements have not addressed it.

In January 2026, Iranian security forces killed thousands of protesters during the largest protests since the Islamic Revolution. That violence by the Iranian state against its own people is a crime that deserves condemnation — and it receives it here, without reservation. But that crime does not license this one. One atrocity committed by a government against its own people does not justify bombing those same people's children at their school desks. The people of Iran were being killed by their own government. Now they are being bombed by foreign powers that promised them liberation. They were bombed while their government was, in that very week, in diplomatic negotiations that were producing results.

A nation of India's history and stated values — a founding member of the United Nations, a democracy that gave the world the concept of ahimsa — cannot be entirely silent about the deaths of schoolchildren.

India has been silent. That silence is noticed. It is not strategic wisdom. It is the appearance of having no position worth stating.

XI. WHAT INDIA'S SILENCE COSTS — BEYOND THE ECONOMY

It is sometimes argued that India's silence is itself a form of strategy — that by saying nothing, India preserves its room to manoeuvre, keeps all its relationships intact, and avoids being drawn into a conflict that is not its own.

But it has a limit. And that limit is reached when silence begins to be read not as strategic patience but as the absence of principle.

India is a nation of 1.4 billion people. It is the world's largest democracy. It is a permanent aspirant to a seat on the UN Security Council. It presents itself to the world as a voice of the Global South — a nation that speaks for the interests of the developing world, of nations that have historically been subjected to the use of force by more powerful states. It has built a foreign policy identity around the principle of strategic autonomy and respect for the sovereignty of nations.

The Gulf nations are watching. China is watching. The countries of the Global South are watching. They are asking a quiet but consequential question: when the use of force is unlawful, when a warship is torpedoed in India's maritime neighbourhood, when schoolchildren are killed in an illegal war — does India speak, or does it issue a concerned statement about the impact on its economy?

That question will be answered by what India does in the coming days. The answer will be remembered long after oil prices stabilise.

XII. WHAT PARLIAMENT CAN DO — FOR EVERY CONSTITUENCY IN INDIA

Every Member of Parliament reading this letter represents a constituency with a direct stake in what has been described here.

There is no parliamentary constituency in India that is insulated from a sustained disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. There is no Member of Parliament whose constituents will not feel the consequences if this war continues and energy prices remain elevated. The scale of India's crude oil import bill — comparable to the combined annual revenues of several of India's largest states — means that every percentage point increase in oil prices is money taken from India's economy and transferred to the accounts of those who set those prices on trading floors in London and New York.

This is why Parliament must act. Not because the opposition demands it, and not because the foreign policy establishment recommends it. But because Parliament's own constituencies are exposed, and because Parliament's own law has been violated for fifty years in a manner that has directly worsened that exposure.

XIII. URGENT PRAYERS

In light of the foregoing, I respectfully and urgently pray:

Prayer 1: India Must Move from Concern to Position

India's Ministry of External Affairs has correctly expressed concern about the impact of this conflict on Indian citizens and the Indian economy. That concern is genuine and every word of it is justified.

But concern is a beginning. It is not adequate to the moment.

India must now move, urgently and publicly, from concern to a clear legal and moral position. That position must include:

A statement that the strikes on Iran violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, for which no legal justification has been established.

A call for an immediate ceasefire and a demand that all parties return to the negotiating table — specifically the Oman-mediated diplomatic channel that was producing results in the week before the bombs fell.

An offer of India's good offices as a trusted and neutral mediator. India has the relationships, the credibility, and the standing to play this role. No other major democracy combines deep ties with the Gulf, a history of non-alignment, and the trust of nations on multiple sides of this conflict.

A move in the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly to demand an emergency session on the protection of civilians.

A formal communication to the United States that the torpedoing of the IRIS Dena — a vessel that had been India's invited guest, in India's own maritime neighbourhood — is an action that India cannot treat as though it did not occur. India expects to be consulted before military action is taken in the Indian Ocean that involves a vessel connected to India's naval diplomacy. This is not a demand that India take sides in the war. It is a demand that India's maritime standing be respected by those who consider themselves India's partners.

Prayer 2: Parliament Must Enforce Its Own Law

The Ministry of Finance must commit, in the current Parliamentary session, to transferring 100% of whatever OID cess is henceforth collected exclusively to the Oil Industry Development Board, for the purposes Parliament intended in 1974.

The 99.7% diversion over fifty years, now confirmed by the Comptroller and Auditor General, must be formally ended by legislative amendment in this session. The matter must not be deferred. It has already been deferred for fifty years.

The fiscal and regulatory regime governing domestic oil and gas exploration must be restructured to attract genuine investment — so that the import dependence this war has exposed as a direct and active threat to national security is, over the coming years, meaningfully reduced.

Parliament enacted this law. Parliament must enforce it.

Respected Prime Minister, respected Members of Parliament —

A war in the Persian Gulf has arrived.

A domestic failure — five decades of diverting a cess that Parliament had explicitly earmarked for energy security — has ensured that India meets this moment with import dependence at its highest recorded level. The two failures have converged: one imposed from outside by an illegal war, one self-inflicted over fifty years of governance. Together, they have left India exposed at the moment of risk.

India has expressed concern.

The world will not remember India's concern.

The world will remember whether India had a position.

If the war ends tomorrow and oil prices return to where they were last month, the unfinished business remains. Iran will not be the same. The Middle East will not be the same. The norms of the international order will not be the same. And India's energy dependence — created in part by Parliament's own unfulfilled law — will not have changed.

A nation of India's size, history, democratic standing, and strategic weight is called upon to do more than note what it fears. It is called upon to name what is unlawful, to demand what is necessary, and to offer what it uniquely can: a principled, independent voice in a world that is rapidly running out of them.

India must not be the nation that stops at concern.

K V DHANANJAYAdvocate, Supreme Court of India