The rejection by the Returning Officer of the nomination of Smt. Meenakshi Natarajan for the election to the Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh sets a dangerous precedent. It is against the law. What is at stake is not a seat; it is the architecture of trust on which every election in this country rests.
First, the law of disclosure. Our election law does not require a candidate to disclose every grievance, every complaint, every notice that anyone, anywhere, may have raised against her. It requires the disclosure of criminal cases that have travelled to a defined judicial stage. Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 speaks of pending cases in which a charge has been framed for offences carrying a sentence of two years or more, and of past convictions. Form 26 — the affidavit every candidate swears — asks, in terms, for pending cases "in which cognizance has been taken by a Court." The scheme is deliberate, and it is wise. The law fixes the duty of disclosure at the stage of cognizance or the framing of charge for a simple reason: those are the stages at which the judicial process itself notifies the person concerned that she stands accused before a court. Before cognizance, there may be a complaint of which the person is wholly unaware, a notice whose fate is undecided, an allegation that may never mature into a case at all. To demand the disclosure of what the law has not yet recognised as a criminal case would be to demand the disclosure of bare accusations.
Now apply that law to the facts. Smt. Natarajan's position — placed by her before the Election Commission itself in a written memorandum — is that what existed against her was a notice issued upon a private complaint in a Telangana court, of which no court had taken cognizance. If that is so, then Form 26 did not require its disclosure; indeed, Form 26 contains no column in which such a matter could even be entered. Her non-disclosure was not concealment. It was compliance. The High Court of Karnataka, only two years ago, in B.G. Uday v. H.G. Prashanth (Judgment dated 24 April 2024 in Criminal Revision Petition No.1157 of 2023) said in so many words that cases in which cognizance has not been taken and charges have not been framed need not be disclosed in the nomination affidavit. In the Karnataka case, a candidate was convicted under Section 125A of the very same Act for omitting to disclose, in his Form 26 affidavit, a criminal case in which no charge had been framed and no cognizance had been taken. Setting aside the candidate’s conviction, the High Court held that: “…Therefore, it is not that every criminal case launched against a candidate either by way of registering the FIR or by moving the private complaint, has to be disclosed in the affidavit even when charges have not been framed or cognizance of the offences alleged has not been taken, as the case may be….”. The judgment of the High Court was appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal (SLP Criminal No.8422/2024 dismissed on 9-Jul-2024). This is not an obscure or contested proposition; it is the settled understanding of the law across the country.
And yet the nomination was rejected in this case. A candidate who answered the form truthfully, as the form is written and as the courts have read it, was thrown out of a parliamentary election at the stage of scrutiny — and her rivals stand elected without a contest. The statute itself commands the Returning Officer not to reject a nomination for any defect that is not of a substantial character. Where the candidate had a complete legal justification for the manner in which she filled her affidavit, where was the substantial defect? Where, indeed, was any defect at all?
The Supreme Court, in dismissing her Writ Petition today, did only what the Constitution compelled it to do. Article 329(b) bars every court from questioning an election except through an election petition before the jurisdictional High Court after the election is over, and that has been the settled law since the earliest years of the Republic. What is the law's only remedy worth in actual practice? An election petition that is supposed to be decided in six months is sometimes not decided within the term of the very seat that was fought over.
That is precisely why everything turns on the Election Commission getting it right the first time — and that is precisely why this episode is so grave. A democracy of our scale works on one quiet assumption: that every political party, whether it sits in government or in opposition, can repose its faith in the impartial working of the Election Commission of India. Parties accept defeat, candidates accept rejection, voters accept results — not because they are pleased, but because they believe the referee is honest. The moment a Returning Officer can extinguish a candidature on a ground the law does not sanction, and the candidate is told that her remedy lies in a trial that could outlive the seat, that faith begins to corrode. And faith of this kind, once corroded, does not corrode for one party alone; it corrodes for all.
I therefore say, as a lawyer and as a citizen: the Election Commission of India owes the country a public, reasoned explanation of the legal basis on which this nomination was rejected, measured against the actual text of Section 33A and Form 26.