On 17 February 2026 — nine days from now — the Greater Bengaluru Authority proposes to auction 7,020 properties across five zones of Bengaluru. The number is not a typographical error. Seven thousand and twenty.
When a government body proposes to extinguish the ownership of seven thousand properties in a single day, and appears to have done so without checking whether it lawfully can, silence becomes difficult to justify.
I. The Part Nobody Wants to Hear
Let me begin with sympathy for the other side.
Municipal finance in India is a quiet catastrophe. Property tax compliance in Bengaluru has been, for decades, a masterclass in creative avoidance. Politicians have lacked the nerve to revise assessments. Citizens have lacked the inclination to self-assess honestly. The bureaucracy has lacked the infrastructure to catch either. The result is a city whose technology parks glitter while its municipal treasury would embarrass a taluk panchayat.
So when the GBA announces that the age of leniency is over, the instinct is to stand up and applaud.
I would urge you to remain seated, however.
II. The Proclamation List — A Case Study in Not Reading Your Own Statute
I have examined the proclamation list published on the GBA's website. It is revealing — not for what it tells us about tax defaulters, but for what it tells us about the GBA itself.
The list includes properties of educational institutions. This is remarkable, because the GBA's own statute says they should not be there.
The first problem is the GBA's own law. Section 154 of the Greater Bengaluru Governance Act, 2024 exempts land and buildings of educational institutions from property tax. One does not need a law degree to spot the difficulty: you cannot auction a property for non-payment of a tax that the property does not owe. And yet, there they are — schools and colleges, on a list headed for the auction block.
The second problem is an entirely separate statute. Section 107 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 prohibits the attachment or auction of properties of registered educational institutions — regardless of the reason — unless the Education Department has first issued a written clearance, after satisfying itself in writing that the action will not disrupt the institution's functioning. This is not a suggestion. It is a statutory bar. Its purpose is plain: no child's classroom should be sold to balance a municipal ledger. The GBA does not appear to have obtained such a clearance; it has broken the law.
The third problem is constitutional. Under Section 110(1)(i) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 — which continues to govern Mangaluru, Mysuru, Dharwad, and every other municipal corporation in the State — all educational institutions, government and private alike, are exempt from property tax. When the BBMP Act, 2020 was enacted, Section 152 quietly narrowed this exemption to government institutions only, stripping every private school and college in Bengaluru of a protection that identical institutions in every other Corporation in Karnataka continued to enjoy. The Karnataka High Court recognised this for what it was — "gross discrimination" under Article 14 of the Constitution — and stayed the BBMP's demands. The legislature corrected itself through the BBMP (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Karnataka Act No. 12 of 2023), restoring the exemption.
But this is where the story acquires a particular flavour.
The BBMP, undeterred by the amendment, then attempted to recover property tax from private educational institutions for the intervening period — 2020 to 2023. Next, the Karnataka High Court quashed the BBMP's recovery circular outright, and ordered that any amounts already deposited be adjusted against future dues.
Let me state the consequence plainly. If any educational institution on the GBA's current auction list is there because of arrears accumulated during this period of 2020 to 2023, the GBA is proposing to auction a property on the strength of a demand that a court of law has already annulled.
III. The Constitution, Briefly
The list also includes what appear to be properties of the Central Government and its departments. Article 285 of the Constitution of India exempts Union property from all taxes imposed by a State or any authority within a State. This is not a provision that admits of creative interpretation. Proposing to auction Central Government property for non-payment of State tax is not aggressive governance. It is constitutional illiteracy, committed in public.
Properties of State Government bodies also feature in the list. The spectacle of one arm of the State Government proposing to auction the property of another arm of the same Government has an undeniable comic quality. But comedy, as far as I am aware, is not a recognised ground for the deprivation of property under Article 300A.
IV. Due Process — Or the Absence of It
The deeper problem, however, is not who is on the list. It is how anyone gets on it at all.
The auction of immovable property is the final, irreversible civil consequence available to the State. It extinguishes ownership and transfers title by administrative action. That power must be preceded by advance notice, a physically accessible hearing, and a reasoned finding by a competent officer that a default exists. A hearing — in which a human being sits across from another human being, examines the facts, and applies mind before signing an order.
Officers get calculations wrong. Officers overlook that a building has been modified, subdivided, or converted. Officers ignore that a court order protects the property. And I say this not as a theoretical proposition but from direct professional experience: I have seen officers knowingly disregard subsisting court orders and record findings of default against properties that were not in default.
When adjudication is replaced by automation and an uploaded proclamation substitutes for a heard objection, the question is no longer whether errors will occur. The adjudication is bound to teem with errors.
V. Who Is Doing the Auctioning
A final observation that should trouble anyone who takes the Seventy-Fourth Amendment seriously.
The Greater Bengaluru Governance Act was passed in March 2025 over the objections of a significant section of civil society, all of whom warned that it concentrates power in the State Government while hollowing out elected local self-governance. The GBA is chaired by the Chief Minister. It is staffed entirely by appointees. It has not held a single election. Not one councillor serves under it.
The body now exercising the most extreme coercive power available under municipal law — the power to extinguish a citizen's ownership of immovable property by a stroke of administrative action — derives its authority from a statute, but its legitimacy from no voter in Bengaluru.
VI. What I Am Not Saying — and What I Am
What I am saying is this.
When the State proposes to take a citizen's home, a school's campus, or a government office, it must do so as a constitutional State — not as a desperate one. Revenue targets do not replace due process. Uploaded proclamations do not replace hearings. A spreadsheet is not an adjudicatory order. And the Karnataka Education Act is not an optional formality to be discovered after the auction, if at all.
The rule of law is not tested when institutions are comfortable. It is tested precisely when they are under pressure — when the treasury is short, the year is ending, and the temptation to treat process as an obstacle rather than a safeguard is at its most acute.