Several requests have been received to write about this judgment. This press release seeks to clarify its scope and limitations.

I. WHAT IS THE SC/ST ACT — AND WHAT MAKES IT UNIQUE?

The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is a criminal law enacted by Parliament. It is a law that makes certain conduct a crime punishable with imprisonment.

But this is not an ordinary criminal law. It has features that set it apart from every other penal statute in the country.

First, it is not a law of general application. It does not apply to all citizens equally. It creates offences that can only be committed by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe against a person who is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. This Act was designed to address the specific social evil of caste violence and humiliation directed at historically oppressed communities.

Second, the procedural safeguards. Investigation must be conducted by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police —not the Station House Officer who would normally investigate regular criminal cases. Trials are held before designated Special Courts.

Third, anticipatory bail is restricted. The accused in an SC/ST Act case faces procedural disadvantages that do not apply in other criminal cases.

It is precisely because the consequences for the accused are severe and the procedural protections so limited — that courts apply the strictest scrutiny to ensure that every ingredient of the offence, including the caste status of the victim, is established beyond doubt.

As per the Rajya Sabha reply dated December 17, 2025 (Unstarred Question No. 2050), approximately 57,766 cases were registered for crimes against Scheduled Castes across India in 2023 alone. Rs. 493.20 Crores was released to States in 2024–25 for implementing the Act.

II. HOW DOES THE LAW DEFINE "SCHEDULED CASTE"?

The Act itself does not create its own definition. It borrows the definition from the Constitution. Article 366(24) of the Constitution says "Scheduled Castes" means such castes as are deemed under Article 341 to be Scheduled Castes. Article 341 empowers the President of India, after consultation with the Governor of each State, to specify by public notification which castes shall be deemed Scheduled Castes.

Accordingly, the President issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Clause 2 lists the specific castes for each State. Clause 3 adds a critical restriction: "Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 2, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste."

So the chain is: the SC/ST Act punishes atrocities against Scheduled Castes → the definition comes from the Constitution → the Presidential Order lists specific castes but excludes anyone professing a religion other than Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist. This is the chain that determined the outcome in Chinthada Anand.

III. WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

Chinthada Anand, born into the Madiga community — listed as a Scheduled Caste at Serial No. 32 for Andhra Pradesh — had converted to Christianity and served as a Pastor for over a decade, conducting Sunday prayer meetings at different houses in his village in Guntur District.

On January 24, 2021, he alleged that while returning home after conducting Sunday prayers, he was stopped at the entrance of a nearby hamlet by six persons of the Reddy community along with about twenty-five others. He alleged that his mobile phone and vehicle keys were snatched, that he was dragged, beaten, abused by caste name in public view, and threatened with death. Threats were also allegedly extended against his family members and children. An FIR was registered the next day under the SC/ST Act — specifically Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) — as well as IPC Sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) read with Section 34 (common intention). A chargesheet was filed before the Special Court under the SC/ST Act for Guntur District.

The accused approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the entire proceedings. The High Court quashed the case. The Complainant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on March 24, 2026, on two independent grounds.

On the SC/ST Act charges: The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that since the appellant had been openly professing Christianity and functioning as a Pastor for over a decade, he could not be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste under Clause 3 of the Presidential Order. Without that foundational status, the SC/ST Act simply could not be invoked. It did not matter that the appellant held a caste certificate describing him as Hindu- Madiga, or that the Tahsildar had issued such a certificate. The Court held that a certificate cannot override the constitutional bar — if the person is, in fact, professing Christianity at the material time, the certificate is of no avail.

On the IPC charges: Separately and independently, the Supreme Court examined whether the allegations of wrongful restraint, hurt and criminal intimidation were made out even on the prosecution's own case. It found that the allegations rested solely on the complainant's own statement. The claim of a large mob of thirty people attacking the complainant was not supported by the chargesheet or by any witness other than the complainant himself.

The Court concluded that continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

IV. THE CONVICTION RATE CONTEXT

The conviction rates in the very States concerned tell the story.

As per NCRB data tabled in Parliament, the conviction rate for SC atrocity cases in Andhra Pradesh was 5.3% (2021), 4.0% (2022), and 3.1% (2023). In Karnataka: 1.6%, 1.4%, and 2.2%.

In Andhra Pradesh, roughly 96 to 97 out of every 100 SC cases end in acquittal. In Karnataka, approximately 98 out of 100. These numbers raise a real and uncomfortable possibility that a significant proportion of prosecutions are not sustained by credible evidence — and that some may be entirely bogus. In such a landscape, when a case rests on the complainant's word against the accused, courts scrutinise at the threshold whether the prosecution discloses any offence at all. That is precisely what happened with the IPC charges here.

V. WHY THIS JUDGMENT DOES NOT GOVERN OTHER DOMAINS

A. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence

Over six decades, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled upon caste and religion differently in different contexts. By 1975, in C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal, the Court declared caste to be more of a social combination than a religious group. By 1983, in S. Anbalagan v. B. Devarajan, the Court held conversion merely puts caste into "eclipse." In K.P. Manu v. Scrutiny Committee (2015) — which the Chinthada Anand judgment itself relies upon — the Court allowed a person whose grandfather had converted to Christianity to claim SC status upon converting to Hinduism.

B. Educational Reservations

Educational reservations operate under Articles 15(4) and 15(5) of the Constitution, which empower the State to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

The critical difference is this: educational reservation cases do not, in themselves, arise as prosecutions under a penal statute in the way this SC/ST Act case did. No one is sentenced to imprisonment for admitting a student. Courts interpreting educational and welfare legislation apply a purposive and liberal construction, one that advances the object of social justice and inclusion rather than one that narrows the class of beneficiaries.

This is not theory. It is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence — including a case that the Chinthada Anand judgment itself cites.

Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao (1976) was decided by a Constitution Bench of five Judges. The facts were these: Y. Mohan Rao was born to parents who were Madigas — the very same Scheduled Caste community as the appellant in Chinthada Anand — in the very same State of Andhra Pradesh. But his parents had converted to Christianity before he was born. Mohan Rao was therefore born a Christian. He had never been a Hindu or a Madiga. He later converted to Hinduism, claimed Scheduled Caste status, and sought admission to Guntur Medical College under the reserved quota.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court allowed his claim. It held that a person belonging to the Madiga caste would be deemed a Scheduled Caste provided he professes Hindu or Sikh religion "at the relevant time" — and that it was not necessary that he should have been born a Hindu. The emphasis was on the religion professed at the material time, community acceptance, and the social reality of caste. The Court did not apply the kind of strict exclusion that a criminal prosecution demands. It examined the totality of circumstances.

The same State, the same caste, the same Presidential Order, the same Clause 3. But a fundamentally different legal context — educational admission, not criminal prosecution — and a fundamentally different outcome. The two decisions coexist because they operate in different legal domains with different interpretive principles.

This is not an inconsistency. It is the law working as it should — applying different standards to different contexts, with different consequences for the persons affected.

C. Legislative Reservations — And Election Disputes

Consider M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu (2010) — cited in Chinthada Anand itself. M. Chandra won the 2006 Tamil Nadu Assembly election from the Rajapalayam (SC) reserved constituency on an AIADMK ticket. The defeated candidate filed an election petition alleging the winner was actually "Glory Chandra," born to Christian parents, a student of a CSI school, whose husband was named "Soosaimanickam."

The election petitioner's witnesses were affiliated to the rival DMK party. One, a DMK village secretary, began by asserting the winner's name proved she was Christian. Under cross-examination, he said: "I do not know as to which religion the first respondent and her family members are professing. At the instance of the election petitioner, I have come as a witness today." He had never visited the appellant's home, did not know her mother, and had no document proving anything. He did, however, confirm he was "unhappy that the second respondent lost." Another DMK witness claimed the wedding was in a church, then admitted he did not actually know which religion's customs were followed. He had no proof of Christianity. He helpfully volunteered that in the region, "conversion from Hinduism to Christianity and vice versa happens frequently."

The winning AIADMK candidate's witnesses included community members and functionaries who supported her AIADMK candidacy. The village temple priest, the village Nattamai, and relatives testified she worshipped Hindu deities, celebrated Pongal and Vinayaka Chaturthi, and had a pooja room full of pictures of Hindu gods. Her husband, one witness confirmed, worked for the Harijan Welfare Department of the Government — which would have been rather difficult had he been, as the challenger alleged, a practising Christian ineligible for SC status.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgement of the High Court of Madras and restored M. Chandra's election. It held that the burden of proof lies squarely on the challenger, that the evidence was "contradictory and smacks of political rivalry," and that "hypertechnicality requires to be eschewed and the ground realities require to be kept in view."

This is the reality of election disputes involving caste and conversion. They are complex. The witnesses come from rival party offices, and the bright- line test of a criminal statute simply does not translate to this domain.

D. Welfare Schemes

The Chinthada Anand judgment itself records that Andhra Pradesh's G.O. Ms. No. 341 (1977) extends non-statutory concessions to SC converts to Christianity.

VI. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: CLAUSE 3 AND THE QUESTION IT REFUSES TO ANSWER

Everything discussed above is about how the law is. There is a question that this judgment brings to the surface — a question that Parliament has dodged for seventy-six years.

When the Presidential Order was issued in 1950, Clause 3 restricted Scheduled Caste status to persons professing Hinduism. The logic was straightforward: caste is a feature of Hindu society; therefore Scheduled Castes can only exist within Hinduism.

Then, in 1956, Parliament amended the Order to include Sikhs. Why? Because it was observed that caste-based disabilities persisted within the Sikh community despite the fact that Sikhism, as a matter of doctrine, rejects the caste system. Shree Guru Nanak's teachings repudiate caste distinctions. The Guru Granth Sahib does not recognise caste hierarchy. And yet, the Parliament looked at the ground reality, not the scripture, and amended the Order.

In 1990, Parliament did the same for Buddhists. This was even more striking. The Parliament recognised that a Dalit who converted to Buddhism remained, in the eyes of the village and the marketplace, a Dalit. The theological rejection of caste by Buddhism did not prevent caste from following the convert into the new faith. Parliament looked at the ground reality, not the scripture, and amended the Order again.

Now consider Christianity. The Chinthada Anand judgment itself, at paragraph 39, records that Christianity "by its very theological foundation, does not recognize or incorporate the institution of caste." True. But neither does Sikhism. Neither does Buddhism. The theological rejection of caste is common to all three faiths — and yet Parliament included two and excluded one.

And what does the ground reality show? The Hon’ble Supreme Court answered this question thirty years ago. In S. Anbalagan v. B. Devarajan (1983), the Hon’ble Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, there exist "Christian Reddies, Christian Kammas, Christian Nadars, Christian Adi Andhras, Christian Adi Dravidas and so on." The practice of caste within these communities, the Court observed, was "so rigorous that there are intermarriages with Hindus of the same caste but not with Christians of another caste." A Christian Adi Dravida will marry a Hindu Adi Dravida and not a Christian Kamma.

The same observation applies — with at least equal force — to Indian Muslim communities. The distinctions between Ashraf, Ajlaf, and Arzal among Indian Muslims are well-documented. The Justice Ranganath Misra Commission (2007) specifically recorded that Dalit converts to Christianity and Islam continue to suffer social and economic disabilities comparable to those of Hindu Dalits, and recommended that the religious bar in Clause 3 be deleted altogether.

So here is the uncomfortable arithmetic. The stated justification for including Sikhs and Buddhists in the Scheduled Castes Order was that caste persists in those communities despite doctrinal rejection. The evidence shows — and the Supreme Court has judicially observed — that caste persists with equal or greater tenacity in Christian communities. The doctrinal rejection of caste is found across all four faiths. The only difference is that two faiths have been included and two have not.

Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. It demands that any classification must rest on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. If the object is to protect persons suffering from caste-based disabilities, and if caste-based disabilities persist across religious boundaries, then a classification that includes Sikhs and Buddhists but excludes Christians and Muslims does not appear to rest on any differentia that can be called intelligible. It rests on a historical accident — the political circumstances of 1956 and 1990 — not on any principled distinction.

This question was not before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chinthada Anand. The Court was interpreting the law as it stands — not as it ought to be. It applied Clause 3 strictly, as it was bound to do in the context of a criminal prosecution.

CONCLUSION

This judgment belongs to the domain of criminal law — and a very specific criminal law at that, one with unique features found nowhere else in the Indian penal system. It interprets that law strictly, as courts must. It does not directly or indirectly decide educational reservations, legislative reservations, welfare benefits, or policy-based schemes. The Supreme Court's own jurisprudence over six decades demonstrates that the relationship between caste and religion is understood differently depending on the legal context. A judgment rendered in one context ought not to be extended, through conjecture, to entirely different domains governed by different principles.

And the deeper question — whether a classification that includes Sikhs and Buddhists but excludes Christians and Muslims, when the factual basis is indistinguishable, can survive Article 14 — remains the elephant in the room. It has been there since 1950. It grew larger in 1956 and again in 1990. Sooner or later, someone will have to look at it.

Signed PDF of this piece

K V DHANANJAYAdvocate, Supreme Court of India