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# Who Readied the Guns at the Gates of Parliament? The Nation Is Entitled to an Answer
- URL: https://www.kvdhananjay.in/who-readied-the-guns-at-the-gates-of-parliament-the-nation-is-entitled-to-an-answer/
- Published: 2026-07-22T04:30:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-22T07:53:45.000Z
- Description: Asks who authorised armed positions facing the marchers on Parliament Street on 20 July.
- Author: K V Dhananjay
- Tags: Press Releases, #new-delhi

The beating of young marchers on Parliament Street on Monday (20-Jul-26) has already been condemned across the country. Citizens, lawyers and journalists have recorded the lathi charges, the tear gas and the injuries — many to first-time protesters.

I write instead about something the nation watched on live television — and has, strangely, not yet questioned.

As the march drew near, footage from outside Parliament — some of it shared by the marchers themselves — appears to show armed security personnel taking up positions at the perimeter, with their weapons oriented towards the road from which the crowd was expected to approach.

Was this merely routine protective deployment? Were the personnel placed in an enhanced state of operational readiness because of a specific threat assessment? What instructions governed their posture, and under what circumstances, if any, could those firearms have been used? I cannot recall, in recent decades, a sight quite like this: armed personnel visibly taking position at the gates of Parliament as ordinary citizens marched towards it.

The widely circulated images identify at least some of the personnel as belonging to the CISF, which is principally responsible for securing the Parliament House Complex and functions under the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. The streets surrounding the complex remain within the policing structure of Delhi.

**That only sharpens the question: under whose operational command were these armed personnel acting that day, and pursuant to what order, protocol or assessment of threat had they been placed in that posture?**

**The public does not know. It ought to.**

Does a guard at Parliament, on his own, alter his operational posture merely because people appear at the gate — protesters, visitors, schoolchildren on an educational tour?

Perhaps a specific order was given. Perhaps a standing procedure came into operation. Perhaps an alert was raised. Perhaps personnel on the ground exercised discretion under existing security instructions. It does not matter which. In every case, the public is entitled to know what authorised the posture visible that day, who exercised operational command, and what rules stood between those firearms and the approaching crowd.

Every explanation demands accountability. None excuses silence.

Our law recognises an important distinction between maintaining the security of a protected institution and using force to disperse a civilian assembly. Where an assembly is actually sought to be dispersed, Sections 148 and 149 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita themselves insist upon lawful authority and restraint. Section 149 expressly requires that as little force and as little injury be caused as is consistent with dispersal. Behind those provisions lies a broader constitutional principle: State force against citizens cannot be arbitrary or disproportionate. Peaceful demonstration forms part of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 and disproportionate use of force against protesters is illegal.

And where firearms are placed in apparent operational readiness in the vicinity of a civilian protest, democratic accountability requires that the authority responsible for that decision have a name.

The police say barricades were broken, stones were thrown and many of their own personnel were injured. Assume, for the sake of argument, that every one of these allegations is true. Even then, the question survives intact: did the assessed threat require firearms to be placed in an apparent state of operational readiness against that crowd, and, if so, who made that assessment and who possessed the authority to order their use?

**Our own recent history shows what happens when such questions are asked only after the shooting.**

In Thoothukudi in 2018, thirteen citizens were shot dead. The Justice Aruna Jagadeesan Commission found that the firing was unprovoked and began without warning, and recommended action against seventeen police personnel, the then District Collector and three revenue officials. The Commission also reportedly found that the deployment of Executive Magistrates outside their proper jurisdictions gave the firing an appearance of lawful sanction that it did not possess — conduct described as making a mockery of due process.

Two lessons follow.

First, those who use lethal force without lawful authority are personally answerable. “No one told me not to” is no defence.

Second, accountability that arrives years later, over dead bodies, arrives too late.

That is why this matters today, not someday. The organisers of Monday's march have said openly that this was only their first call and that further marches will follow. Another approach to Parliament therefore cannot be ruled out.

Every government — this one included — rests upon a pact: the people accept authority and cooperate with it, and authority, in return, exercises force only lawfully, proportionately and as a last resort. When a large section of the young begins withdrawing its cooperation, how the State responds determines whether that pact holds.

**If the next march meets a perimeter where rifles have already been placed in an enhanced state of readiness, where nobody outside the chain of command knows what instructions have been issued, and where one mistake or one nervous finger stands between a demonstration and a catastrophe, the consequences of a single shot may pass beyond anyone's control.** Including the Government's.

**I therefore call upon the Ministry of Home Affairs to state publicly, and without delay:**

1. **who exercised operational command over the armed personnel seen outside Parliament on 20 July 2026;**
2. **what order, standing procedure, security alert or protocol authorised the posture in which they were deployed; and**
3. **what rules govern the possible use of lethal force at Parliament's perimeter when a civilian assembly approaches.**

A democracy may survive a lathi charge. It will not easily survive the day a bullet is fired at its own children from the gates of its own Parliament — and, afterwards, nobody can say who authorised the gun to be readied in the first place.

## Postscript: Three Warnings from Our Own Neighbourhood

Some will say that these fears are exaggerated — that India is stable, that its institutions are strong, and that a protest by young people could never seriously disturb the foundations of the State. I cite the following examples: governments repeatedly underestimate the capacity of unnecessary violence to enlarge the very protest they seek to suppress.

Within the last few years, three of India's neighbours have offered three different versions of that warning.

Sri Lanka, 2022\. For weeks, ordinary Sri Lankans — students, professionals and families — had protested peacefully at Galle Face against an extraordinary economic crisis. On 9 May, violent supporters of the ruling party attacked protest camps at Galle Face and outside the Prime Minister's residence, amid grave criticism of the authorities' failure to prevent the violence. Retaliatory unrest spread rapidly across the country. By the end of the day, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa had resigned. The following day, he and his family were flown under military protection to a naval base. Two months later, protesters entered the President's House and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country. The attack of 9 May did not create Sri Lanka's political crisis. But it became a powerful accelerant of a movement the Government could no longer control.

Bangladesh, 2024\. University students initially protested against a government employment quota — a dispute that might, in another political climate, have remained a question of policy. Then the confrontation changed character. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina used language associating protesters with the collaborators of 1971, an accusation of extraordinary gravity in Bangladesh. Days later, student Abu Sayed was shot by police after standing before officers with his arms spread open; a subsequent United Nations investigation concluded that he posed no threat when he was killed. The killing was captured on camera. The movement ceased to be only about quotas. Within weeks, after years of accumulated political tension and increasingly violent confrontation, a Prime Minister who had governed continuously for fifteen years fled the country, and crowds soon entered her official residence. The dead became the grievance.

Nepal, 2025\. In September last year, young people took to the streets after the Government moved to restrict major social media platforms. On the first day of the protests, security forces used live ammunition and around nineteen people were killed. The crisis escalated with extraordinary speed. By the following day, the Prime Minister had resigned, Parliament and other public buildings were attacked and set ablaze, and the Government had collapsed into a political crisis of extraordinary proportions. The bullets did not end the movement. They transformed it.

Three neighbours. Three very different political crises. But one recurring lesson.

A protest that begins with a limited grievance can be transformed by the State's own excessive response into something vastly larger than the grievance with which it began. Governments that imagine force will restore authority often discover, too late, that the manner in which force is used has destroyed it. None of these governments intended what followed.

That is why I ask today, while the question can still be asked calmly: **who readied the guns at the gates of our Parliament, under what authority, and what rules governed what might have happened next?**

**It is not a question asked against the State. It is a question asked to save the State from a mistake that three of our neighbours have already made before us.**

[Signed PDF of this piece](https://www.kvdhananjay.in/content/files/2026/11/K-V-Dhananjay-2026-07-22-Guns-at-the-Gates-of-Parliament.pdf)